Abstract: This paper will first provide an overview of the Canada Pension Plan Disability (CPPD) benefits program. CPPD ostensibly serves to provide income security to pension-contributors who find themselves incapable of work due to chronic health conditions. Rising CPPD caseloads during the 1980s and early 1990s coupled with growing debt aversion in Canada led to predictions that the pension well would soon run dry. Such fears lent credence to substantial pension reforms in 1998 - and cuts to CPPD benefits. The eligibility criteria are now so restrictive and the refusal rate of applicants so high that it seems as though what were formerly considered ‘entitlements’ of highly vulnerable citizens are increasingly viewed as charity. Moreover, I will argue that women have felt the effects of these changes to a greater extent than men due to the distinct nature of their work patterns and disabilities. Neo-liberal and ‘Third Way’ discourse that centers on individual responsibility and productivity have eroded the unifying principles inherent in the welfare state at the time of its inception. The aim of the paper is to argue that the inaccessibility of CPPD illustrates the extent to which social citizenship rights have diminished - which casts an ominous shadow on the popular mythology of the Canadian welfare state.

Introduction

According to the Social Union Framework Agreement (SUFA), the Government of Canada is committed to working toward strengthening programs and services designed to protect and promote the well-being of Canadians. In pursuit of this objective, the framework concludes that “the first priorities should be children in poverty and persons with disabilities” (SUFA 1999). While much attention has been directed toward the former through attempts to eradicate child poverty and debate over a universal child care system, the latter group has remained on the margins of public policy discussions. Canadians with debilitating health conditions who are incapable of employment yet who fail to meet the rigid requirements of CPPD suffer even greater social exclusion than the unfortunate individuals who do qualify for benefits. Little follow-up on the health and economic status of failed applicants has been done, leaving one to conclude that public sympathy and state support are not forthcoming. Women also find themselves in a disproportionately precarious position as they tend to rely on CPPD to a greater degree than men yet have more difficulty qualifying for the program. Such problems highlight the perils of “the traditional model of worker-citizenship, where the welfare state [is] organized on an occupational basis and where the full social citizen [is] assumed to be a full-time, full-year, paid employed male” (Vosko 2002: 185). Existing literature on CPPD addresses the need to provide disabled Canadians with equal citizenship through social security (Prince 2005, 2003; Dunn 2006) yet to date little analysis has been done on the productivity agenda at the heart of this issue - and the incompatibility of neo-liberal policymaking and social citizenship rights, more broadly.

The Canada Pension Plan was established in 1966 after a decade of political debate. The purpose of the CPP as outlined in a 1964 White Paper was to “make reasonable minimum levels of income available at normal retirement ages, and to people who become disabled, and to the dependents of people who die” (Torjman 2002: 6). Specifically, the CPP consisted primarily of universal coverage for Canadians over the age of 70, means- tested benefits for individuals between 65 and 69, modest payments to spouses and dependents of deceased contributors, and universal disability coverage. For the purposes of this paper, only the latter component - disability benefits - will be discussed in further detail.

From its inception in 1966, CPPD has been the largest, long-term income security program for disabled Canadians, paying benefits to approximately 280 000 adults in 2002 (Government of Canada, 2003). CPPD offers disability coverage to Canadians who are not covered by private insurance plans. Unlike private insurers, CPPD does not exclude individuals who are deemed ‘at risk’ of leaving work due to health problems and requires no medical screening. Eligibility is assessed according to two main criteria - whether or not the applicant contributed to the plan for the minimum period and whether or not the applicant fits CPPD’s definition of ‘disabled’. The contribution period has been revised several times due to both fiscal pressure and public counter-pressure.

Date/Period	Minimum duration of CPP contributions
Prior to 1986	5 of the last 10 years
1986-1997	2 of the last 5 years OR 5 of the last 10 years
1997-2007	4 of the last 6 years OR any 4 years
Late 2007	If contributed 25 years or more, 3 of the last 6 years If contributed less than 25 years, 4 of the last 6 years

The definition component of CPPD eligibility criteria is equally problematic yet has been passed over by recent reforms.¹ A disability must be considered ‘severe and prolonged’ in order for an individual to qualify for benefits. CPPD legislation defines ‘severe’ as “a mental or physical disability that regularly stops you from doing any type of work (full-time, part-time or seasonal).” A ‘prolonged’ disability is one that is “likely to be long term, or is likely to result in your death” (Service Canada).

Applicants who are unhappy with the results of their case may appeal for reconsideration at three different levels. The first level involves a written request for reconsideration which is reviewed by a member of HRSD staff who is unfamiliar with the original decision. Appellants usually provide additional medical evidence to support their case. The second level involves a hearing before the Review Tribunal which is comprised of a lawyer, a member of the medical profession, and a layperson. Finally, the third level of appeal - made to the Pension Appeals Board (PAB) - consists of a hearing presided over by a panel of three judges. A snapshot of the numbers of CPPD applicants involved in the appeal process in 1998-99 show that the number of first level appeals is substantial (22 452). The vast majority - 72 percent - of appellants were denied at the first level. Second and third level appeals are far less substantial in this period, at 9 607 and 3 967, respectively. HRSD is also entitled to appeal the decisions rendered at the second and third level. Moreover, applicants who succeed in qualifying for CPPD may be reassessed and lose their benefits if they are considered to have rehabilitated sufficiently to return to work.

Evolution of CPPD - From Accessibility to Sustainability

The first CPPD payments were made in 1970 and caseloads grew consistently until the mid-1990s due to the increase in eligible applicants and general awareness of the benefits (Torjman 2002). The history of CPPD can be summed up by a series of legislative changes as the government struggled with the task of adhering to the principles of ensuring income security for disabled Canadians while regulating eligibility to control costs. As Torjman argues, quantitative data seems to support the hypothesis that the increase in CPPD caseloads corresponded to the relaxed requirements for contributions in 1987 (see Figure 1). A similar attempt to make disability benefits more accessible in 1992 removed a time limit on applications. Yet, as Torjman argues, other forces led to the spike in CPPD claimants prior to the mid-1990s, including “improved information about the program and its benefits,” higher levels of unemployment among older workers, as well as increased incidence of referrals from provincial social assistance programs and private disability insurers (Torjman 2002: 21). The increase can also be partly explained by the context of “the growing acceptance of conditions - such as stress, chronic fatigue and environmental hypersensitivities - as ‘disabilities’” (Torjman 2002: 27). Clearly, critiques of CPPD that focus on ‘moral hazard’² oversimplify the relationship between workers and the labour market and neglect important soci-political factors.

The period 1995-96 marked a watershed for CPPD - caseloads peaked and subsequent reforms brought about a steady decline in the number of beneficiaries (see Figure 1). Improved economic conditions and a decrease in applicants may be partly responsible for the shift. Yet a stricter interpretation of eligibility criteria dramatically reduced access to CPPD. Guidelines introduced in 1995 no longer allow adjudicators to be influenced by socio-economic factors and require a strict adherence to ‘objective medical evidence.’ According to Torjman, “the tighter medical interpretation of disability appears to exclude many potential claimants with conditions that are not verifiable or quantifiable in a laboratory” (Torjman 2002: 31). Attempts to reign in CPPD expenditures proved effective as the approval rate (expressed as a proportion of the total number of initial decisions) fell from 55.7% in 1990-91 to 38.3% by 2000-2001 (Kerr 2002: 6).

In 1997, Liberal Finance Minister Paul Martin initiated substantial reforms to the CPP, citing a lack of long-term sustainability. Despite the fact that disability expenditures had been decreasing as a percentage of CPP expenditures since 1993-94, (Prince 2003: 73) disability benefits were scaled back as part of the broader reform strategy under Bill C-2. HRDC was careful to convey the message that cuts to CPPD should not be perceived as a lack of compassion for disabled Canadians. Yet, as Prince argues, “these cuts demonstrated that rights conferred by a social insurance program are not an immutable social contract between governments and individuals but could be changed by governments” (Prince 2003: 72). In sum, Bill C-2 tightened eligibility requirements, limited the amount of benefits conferred to eligible applicants, and effectively undermined the social citizenship status of disabled Canadians.

Policy Implications of Villani v Canada (2001)

While the pension reforms were well-supported and ultimately considered a success, resultant hardships for disabled Canadians - who were now deemed ineligible for benefits - became increasingly apparent. A Federal Court ruling in the case of Giuseppe Villani seemed to provide an opening for CPPD reform. Villani was born in Italy and received a grade 5 education before his family emigrated to Canada in 1955. He eventually found a permanent, full-time job at Rothman’s tobacco company. Villani applied for CPPD at the age of 56 due to chronic pain in his knee, shoulders and back, numbness in his leg, and hearing and vision impairments. His application was denied on the basis that his level of disability did not meet the definition of ‘severe’ as outlined in the legislation. Villani appealed the decision at the first two levels and finally to the PAB but was denied each time. In their interpretation of Villani’s situation, PAB argued that: “While one acknowledges immediately that suitable sedentary work with relief times to walk around is not easy to find, the test is not ‘Is the work available?’ but rather, ‘If it were there, could he do it?’ In my opinion the answer is yes” (Federal Court of Appeal - Villani v. Canada 2001).

The Federal Court of Appeal ruled in favour of Villani on August 3, 2001. The judge questioned the severity requirement of CPPD eligibility and deemed it to be unfair and unrealistic. Moreover, he criticized a number of PAB decisions on the basis that they illustrated a “decidedly ungenerous version of the statutory definition of a ‘severe’ disability” which have the effect of “subverting the benevolent purposes of the legislation” (Villani v. Canada 2001). Specifically, the judge argued that CPPD adjudicators used an oversimplified, unrealistic definition of disability that was based on an incomplete depiction of circumstances. The PAB decision in the Villani case rested on idealized assumptions about Villani’s employability and the broader labour market conditions he faced. The judge argued that “the hypothetical occupations which a decision-maker must consider cannot be divorced from the particular circumstances of the applicant, such as age, education level, language proficiency and past work and life experience”(Villani v. Canada 2001: 14). Many appeals invoking the language of Villani have been undertaken since this landmark decision, with mixed success.

Along with problems illustrated through the Villani decision, the accessibility of CPPD is open to criticism for a number of reasons. A House of Commons Standing Committee reported that the evaluation of applicants was conducted in a seemingly arbitrary manner. The committee questioned the practice of CPPD adjudicators (who are normally nurses) of interpreting data provided by physicians and contradicting the physician’s assessment of whether or not an applicant should be considered disabled. Also problematic is the fact that the adjudicators can formulate such a conclusion “without ever having met the applicant.” The Subcommittee also found a “lack of clear statistical data on reasons for rejecting benefit applications and on the economic consequences of such rejections” (House of Commons 2005).

Michael J. Prince, the most prolific analyst of CPPD, recommends two key changes to enhance the accessibility of the program: first, a return to the pre-1998 eligibility criteria pertaining to contributory period; secondly, a revision of the definition of a ‘severe and prolonged’ disability in keeping with the findings of the Villani decision (Prince, 2003: 2). Greater flexibility in the eligibility criteria would ensure recognition of “the episodic and degenerative nature of many disabilities as well as the challenges of finding and keeping employment when living with a disability” (Prince, 2003: 2). While it is readily acknowledged that disabled Canadians face high levels of poverty, according to Prince, less attention is paid to the issues of “inclusion, citizenship and dignity” (Prince 2005: 4). He argues that the discourse on disability in Canada reflects an outdated conception “of disability as a personal tragedy and bio-medical phenomenon” which posits the burden of care on family members. Rather, the focus should shift to addressing “attitudinal, institutional and environmental factors” and prioritizing “equality of rights and full citizenship” for disabled Canadians (Prince 2005: 8). While Prince’s social citizenship paradigm provides a more comprehensive lens for analyzing disability policy - and CPPD, in particular - it is nevertheless premised on a model wherein the unique experiences and problems of women are overlooked.

Disabled Women in a ‘Male-Worker’ Paradigm

The number of women receiving CPPD has risen steadily - from 31.6% of the percentage of recipients in 1990 to 47.6% in 2001 (Kerr 2002: 4). Interpretations of this trend look to the fact that women were disproportionately affected by changes to the contribution period. Women tend to engage in non-standard forms of employment to a greater degree than men and maintain a more fluid attachment to the labour market (Vosko 2000). Therefore, shorter time periods for contributions effectively provide greater access to CPPD for many women.

Changes in eligibility criteria introduced in 1987 and 1993 pertaining to the contributory period may have made it easier for women to qualify for CPPD (Campolieti 2001). However, socio-economic factors such as rising levels of female labour market participation and growth in the service sector and part-time work may be just as significant. In fact, Campolieti’s findings on the sensitivity of women’s employment rates to loosened CPPD eligibility were inconclusive (Campolieti 2001: 191), suggesting that socio-economic factors offer a better interpretation of the rapid increase of women as CPPD beneficiaries after 1987.

A report by the Status of Women Canada found that the 1997-98 changes to CPPD negatively affected women to a greater degree than men for a number of reasons. The new contributory requirements (4 of the last 6 years) made it more difficult for women who “move in and out of the work force” while having children to qualify (Doe and Kimpson 1999: 4). The nature of women’s work differs from men’s and, due to the fact that their domestic and volunteer activities are unpaid, women who remain outside the standard employment relationship have lower pensionable incomes and limited access to private, work-based insurance plans. As a result, women who do not have a substantial history of full-time work have fewer options for income replacement if they become disabled and receive lower levels of CPPD benefits. Retirement benefits paid at age 65 are also scaled back according to the duration of CPPD payments; “the larger the gap between age 65 and the age at which the CPP disability benefit was first paid, the greater the retirement benefit reduction resulting from this rule change” (Doe and Kimpson 1999: 5). The authors of the report argue that disabled women rely on CPPD from an earlier age than men, and therefore see their pensions reduced to a greater extent when they reach retirement age (Doe and Kimpson 1999: 5).

The nature of women’s disabilities also differs from men’s. The Status of Women Report found that “women tend to be more prone to cyclical and fluctuating illness that [create] difficulty in sustaining employment and basic life activities” (Doe and Kimpson 1999: vi). The most common type of disabilities resulting in CPPD benefits are mental disorders (63 171 in 2000) and diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue (79 946 in 2000). These categories saw substantial growth prior to 1998, as did the number of female CPPD beneficiaries (Kerr 2002: 5). Women tend to suffer from less ‘visible’ types of impairments than men and their respective reasons for permanently exiting the labour force differ accordingly. Diseases such as arthritis, multiple sclerosis, chronic fatique syndrome, and unipolar depression “are more frequent in women, and are difficult to diagnose or are believed to be primarily ‘psychological’ as opposed to organic” (Doe and Kimpson 1999: vi).

Current attempts to improve the accessibility of CPPD offer greater hope to male applicants than female due to the gender bias inherent in Canadian disability policy. The Villani decision holds some promise that one’s eligibility for the benefits will be adjudicated in a more reasonable manner, taking ‘real world’ circumstances into consideration. Yet the ‘real world’ circumstances that are deemed relevant are factors such as the applicant’s age, level of education, job experience and training, and regional employment rates. For example, an individual with a Grade 6 education working in a factory who loses a leg in a work-related injury is no longer capable of working at the age of 57. The individual resides in an area where unemployment is high and, after exhausting Workman’s Compensation Benefits, applies for CPPD. While the individual’s injury is undoubtedly serious, the strict interpretation of eligibility is not met as it is possible that a person with only one leg is capable of working at another job. Yet after considering the fact that the individual would have to undergo substantial training to qualify for a job with relatively few physical requirements, and would have to move to find such a job, CPPD adjudicators could be convinced that they should keep in mind the barriers to future employment when rendering their decision. Such an individual is most likely male.

The Villani decision marks an important step in making CPPD more accessible yet it also reinforces the normative model of the standard employment relationship which is both antiquated and gendered. Women are more likely to work part-time, to have high levels of education, and to have transferrable skills such as clerical experience that open up a greater number of potential jobs. As such, they have a more difficult task in proving their eligibility even with the loop hole provided by Villani. Moreover, ‘real world’ circumstances that do apply to women - such as caring for children, domestic work that limits their capacity for full-time employment, and their relative financial insecurity - are missing from the analysis.

Women who qualify for CPPD must restrict their public visibility so as to avoid being seen as ‘well’ on a good day, and thus risk losing their benefits. As a result, many women confine themselves to the domestic sphere, “a space primarily occupied by women” wherein “economic, social and political power, and consequently their social well-being, is reduced” (Chouinard and Crooks 2005: 22). CPPD recipients are at risk of depression due to the social exclusion they face and the stigma associated with subsisting on government payments. Entrenched ideas about one’s duty to work are reflected in CPPD legislation and in society as a whole. Many women receiving CPPD describe themselves as “useless and non-contributing” which “shows how pervasive societal values and attitudes around productivity and self-sufficiency are as the mark of a “good” citizen” (Chouinard and Crooks 2005: 27). The traditional model of worker-citizen equates men who work full-time with the ideal of a contributing member of society. As women’s domestic work continues to be devalued, they fall short of achieving full citizenship status and, ultimately, full citizenship rights. Clearly, this is an insurmountable problem for women with disabilities incapable of labour market participation.

The Clash of Neo-liberalism and Social Citizenship

As Jane Jenson argues, “citizenship is never simply a synonym for nationality” (Jenson, 1997: 627). Many scholars of the welfare state focus on the goal of enhancing social citizenship as its primary objective. T.H. Marshall (1950) is credited with the first comprehensive study of the link between social welfare and citizenship rights. The rapid industrialization of post-war Britain and the social calamities that accompanied the period gave rise to the belief that the state had a unique role to play as overseer of social stability. The state and market shared a common objective; “Marshall’s work claimed that it was the extension of citizenship rights (and the limits on states and markets thereby implied) that made capitalism and its markets workable and sustainable” (Jenson 1997: 630). Marshall’s idea that shared ‘citizenship rights’ would allow a society to transcend ethnic and class differences offers hope to scholars who argue that the welfare state can and should be enhanced rather than scaled back. The argument that income inequality translates into social inequality and, therefore, that generous social policies narrow the gap in social rights as well as income is firmly entrenched in leftist social policy analysis.

Gøsta Esping-Andersen is arguably the founder of this trend as he argues that, at its inception, the welfare state’s “promise was not merely social policy to alleviate social ills and redistribute basic risks, but an effort to rewrite the social contract between government and the citizenry” (Esping-Andersen 1999). Esping-Andersen has inspired a great deal of scholarly work that seeks to revise social policy in order to improve rights, or invokes rights to improve social policy. While the coupling of social policy and citizenship rights is useful in legitimizing and supporting calls for greater investment in the Canadian welfare state, the marriage is a complicated one. As Siltanen argues, “Esping-Andersen’s work into the analytical frame of policy analysis has encouraged a conceptual fusion of social policy and social rights that over-generalizes the connection between them” (Siltanen, 2002: 403). Distinguishing between a guaranteed income and the more abstract guarantee of full and equal citizenship is vital in the context of analyzing the government’s role in supporting disabled Canadians. Yet, despite the problems inherent in Esping-Andersen’s approach, it is still useful to begin with the premise that Canada’s ability to ensure social rights for disabled Canadians can be measured in terms of the accessibility of income support through CPPD.

According to Jenson, the individual forms the fundamental basis of the Canadian citizenship regime (Jenson, 1997: 634). Yet collectivism, in the form of a commitment to social welfare, was heralded as part of the Canadian nation-building project following Confederation. Federalism was considered viable only if citizens could see common bonds and forge a common identity. As Jenson and others have argued, the welfare state was established because of the need to redress the inequalities inherent in capitalism but also because of its potential to unify a diverse collection of regions and people. The mythology of the ‘social Canadian’ became firmly embedded and fostered a distinct, pan-Canadianism that centered on “belonging to a certain type of society, one in which a concern for the quality of the collective experience provided a counterpart to the emphasis on individual and market freedom that reigned in the US” (White 2003: 58).

Yet tensions between individual and collective interests remained and have become most noticeable in recent decades with the challenge of neo-liberalism in the realm of public policy. The Canadian government is increasingly fraught with contradictions as it maintains that Canadians are bound together by their commitment to the common good (in the name of federalism) while favoring unbridled individualism (in the name of prosperity). A clear winner is emerging, according to Brodie, as the government has “progressively abandoned the social covenant upon which the postwar social citizenship regime was based” (Brodie 2002: 378).

Contemporary debates on the future of the Canadian welfare state grapple with the ‘Third Way’ proposed by renowned sociologist, Anthony Gibbens (1998). For those weary of the traditional class-based framework of public policy analysis, the Third Way seemed to offer hope of compromise and a way to put the acrimony between left and right behind. In order to achieve this objective, White argues, “Third Way thinking seeks to shift the focus to relations between individuals and communities, to social rights balanced by social responsibilities, and to collaborative relations between the public, private and voluntary sectors” (White 2003: 53). The Third Way became popular among welfare state scholars at approximately the same moment in time that neo-liberalism came to dominate politics. While The Third Way is by no means synonymous with neo-liberalism, they have become mutually reinforcing concepts in the context of Canadian welfare state development. The most important distinction is that The Third Way is a social theory while neo-liberalism provides a normative, economic model of society. Yet both have influenced public policymaking in Canada and the outcome of their application is similar - and can be summarized by the emphasis on individual responsibility and productivity.

Neo-liberal policymakers and politicians use Third Way discourse to suggest that structural differences are anachronistic in order to unabashedly shift the focus from income distribution and social welfare to debt reduction and economic prosperity. In the Canadian context, the focus on ‘citizenship rights’ diminished along with social spending over recent decades. According to Siltanen, “taking the place of the social rights-bearing citizen” is “one who is re-familialized, individualized and marketized” (Siltanen 2002: 396). The reaffirmation of the primacy of the individual in Canadian society has “delegitimized group-based claims-making on the state in the name of citizen equality” (Brodie 2002: 378). In other words, the right of the taxpayer to the full proceeds of their labour is now considered just as valid as the right of single mothers to social assistance or the right of a disabled person to CPPD benefits. By relinquishing the task of prioritizing the well-being of its most vulnerable citizens, the Canadian government has effectively withdrawn from the practice of ensuring social citizenship rights through the welfare state.

While many scholars have discussed the growth of ‘social risks’ - or poverty, unemployment, isolation and inequality - produced by neo-liberal Canadian policies, little attention “has been devoted to the implications of withering of social citizenship rights and associated social policies for the ongoing generation of social solidarities and collective identities” (Brodie 2002: 378). The dream of fostering a pan-Canadian identity seems to share the fate of the welfare state on which it was premised. As the government whittled away social spending through the introduction of the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) in 1995, they assured Canadians that “the progressive erosion of their social citizenship rights represented only short-term pain for long-term gain” (Brodie 2002: 388). Now that unprecedented surpluses have replaced the deficit, it is not difficult to see their bluff. As Brodie argues, the neo-liberal principles that have taken hold “give the federal government the paradoxical task of building a broad-based social consensus around a new vision of Canadian society which gives government itself only a minor role” (Brodie 2002: 389). The new ‘vision’ is a Canada in which entitlements are replaced with ‘earned rights’ and one’s value is determined by the market.

Conclusion

The fact that social citizenship rights are tied to one’s ‘productivity’ in Canada has garnered some scrutiny of late, yet mainly in the context of social assistance and child care policy which maintain the core objective of ensuring the labour force attachment of women.³ Yet women who are neither well enough to work or unwell enough to qualify for CPPD find themselves languishing in an economic and social underclass. As Jane Jenson (2001) has pointed out, “the notion has taken hold that virtually all citizens have a responsibility to work.” Moreover, as White argues, the relationship between the state and market has been inverted as “the labour market is no longer seen as a producer of risks, but rather as the solution to the health and social risks associated with poverty and exclusion”(White 2003: 71). It is in the context of disability benefits that this notion is most troubling. Disabled Canadians continue to suffer from discrimination and face “attitudes that stress charity rather than equal rights and citizenship” (Dunn 2006: 413). Unfortunately, the restrictive nature of CPPD eligibility perpetuates such a perspective as well as a gender-biased policy framework. Without an ideological shift toward the socio-democratic emphasis on citizen rights over market success, disabled Canadians - particularly women - will continue to endure marginalization on the basis of their lack of labour market productivity.

References

Brodie, J. (2002) “Citizenship and Solidarity: Reflections on the Canadian Way,” Citizenship Studies, 6, 2002.

Chouinard, V. and Crooks, V.A. (2005) “‘Because they have all the power and I have none’: state restructuring of income and employment supports and disabled women’s lives in Ontario, Canada,” Disability & Society, 20, pp. 19-32.

Doe, T. and Kimpson, S. (1999) “Enabling Income: CPP Disability Benefits and Women with Disabilities” (Research Directorate, Status of Women Canada).

Dunn, P.A. (2006) “Canadians With Disabilities” in A. Westhues (Ed), Canadian Social Policy: issues and perspectives, 4^th Edition (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press).

Esping-Andersen, G. (1999) Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Federal Court of Canada (2001) Villani v. Canada (Attorney General) Federal Court of Appeal Division. FCJ, No. 1217. Available at http://www.http/decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2001

Giddens, A. (1998) The Third Way: the renewal of social democracy (Cambridge, Polity Press).

Government of Canada response to “Listening to Canadians: A First View of the Future of the Canada Pension Plan Disability Program,” The Fifth Report of the Standing Committee on Human Resources Development and the Status of Persons With Disabilities, November 2003. Available at http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/RH4-22-2003E.pdf

Government of Canada (1999) A Framework to Improve the Social Union for Canadians: An Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Governments of the Provinces and Territories. Available at http://www.socialunion.gc.ca/menu_e.html

House of Commons Canada, “Accessibility for All: Report of the Standing Committee on Human Resources, Skills Development, Social Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities,” June 2005.

Kerr, K.B. (2002) “The Canada Pension Plan Disability Program: Statistical Overview, (Ottawa, Library of Parliament).

Jenson, J. (2003) “Social Citizenship, Governance, and Social Policy,” Canada Research Chair in Citizenship and Governance.

Jenson, J. (2001) “Social citizenship in 21^st century Canada: challenges and options,” The Timlin Lecture, University of Saskatchewan. Available at http://www.cprn.org/documents/28981_en.pdf

Jenson, J. (1997) “Fated to live in interesting times: Canada’s changing citizenship regimes,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, XXX, pp. 627-644.

Leski, A. and Thériault, L. (2007) “Rethinking the Productivity of Saskatchewan Welfare Recipients: A Study of Daily Activities and Self-Perceptions, in F. Douglas and G. Geller (Eds), Redefining Productivity for social development and well-being (University of Regina: Social Policy Research Unit).

Mahon, R. (2005) “Rescaling Social Reproduction: Childcare in Toronto/Canada and Stockholm/Sweden,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 29, pp. 341-57.

Marshall, T.H. (1950) Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).

Media Centre, Government of Canada (2007) “Canada’s New Government Improves Access to Canada Pension Plan and Old Age Security Benefits,” Human Resources and Social Development Canada, May 3, 2007. Available at http://nouvelles.gc.ca/web/view/en/index.jsp?articleid=299649&

Orloff, A. (1993) “Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States, in American Sociological Review, 58, pp. 303-328.

Prince, M.J. (2005) “A National Strategy for Disability Supports: Where is the Government of Canada in this Social Project?” Presentation for the Seminar Series School of Rehabilitation Therapy, Faculty of Health Sciences, Queen’s University.

Prince, M.J. (2003) “The Canada Pension Plan Disability Program: Values and Solutions,” Prepared for the House of Commons Sub-Committee on the Status of Persons with Disabilities.

Prince, M.J. (2001) Wrestling with the poor cousin: Canada Pension Plan Disability Policy and Practice, 1964-2001. Available at http://ocrt-bctr.gc.ca/dapdep/r032002/r032002-eng.pdf

Service Canada, Canada Pension Plan Disability Benefits. Available at http://www1.servicecanada.gc.ca/en/isp/pub/cpp/disability/benefits/section1a.shtml

Siltanen, J. (2002) “Paradise Paved? Reflections on the Fate of Social Citizenship in Canada,” Citizenship Studies, 6, 2002, pp. 395-414.

Torjman, S. (2002) The Canada Pension Plan Disability Benefit (Ottawa, Caledon Institute of Social Policy).

Vosko, L.F. (2002) “Mandatory ‘Marriage’ or Obligatory Waged Work: Social

Assistance and Single Mothers in Wisconsin and Ontario,” in Sylvia Bashevkin (Ed), Women’s Work is Never Done: Comparative Studies in Caregiving, Employment, and Social Policy Reform (New York and London: Routledge)

White, D. (2003) “Social Policy and Solidarity, Orphans of the New Model of Social Cohesion,” Canadian Journal of Sociology, pp. 51-76.

Notes:

1. As part of Bill C-36, the Government of Canada has introduced two amendments to CPPD which come into effect by the end of 2007. Applicants with 25 years of contributions or more will only need to demonstrate contributions to CPP in 3 of the last 6 years; applicants with less than 25 years of contributions will still require valid contributions in 4 of the last 6 years. The medical basis of eligibility has not changed. “Canada’s New Government Improves Access to Canada Pension Plan and Old Age Security Benefits,” Human Resources and Social Development Canada, May 3, 2007. Available at nouvelles.gc.ca/web/…; [↩]
2. According to Campolieti,(2001) “all insurance programs, both public and private, are subject to moral hazard problems. This means that it is plausible that the increased generosity of C/QPP disability payments may have also led to an increase in the duration of these claims (as well as their frequency).” M. Campolieti and J. N. Lavis, “Disability Expenditures in Canada, 1970-1996,” Canadian Public Policy, XXVI, p.251. [↩]
3. In her study of child care reforms in Toronto and Sweden, R. Mahon argues that the current social policy agenda resembles Third Way justifications of workfare in that “they both reflect a markedly productivist social policy orientation.” Mahon (2005) “Rescaling Social Reproduction: Childcare in Toronto/Canada and Stockholm/Sweden,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 29, p. 343. A. Orloff (1993) discusses the gendered basis of social citizenship in “Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States, in American Sociological Review, 58, pp. 303-328. Also, A. Leski and L. Thériault (2007) address misconceptions about the productivity of social assistance recipients in “Rethinking the Productivity of Saskatchewan Welfare Recipients: A Study of Daily Activities and Self-Perceptions, in Redefining Productivity,” in F. Douglas and G. Geller, eds., (2007) Redefining Productivity for social development and well-being, University of Regina: Social Policy Research Unit, pp. 75-94. [↩]

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