On Realism and Environmental Advocacy
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Last Modified: March 30, 2008 Issue: November 2007 |
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Recent, separate discussions with Elise and Matt prompted me to think a bit more about epistemology (how we can know things) and debates on the environment. Matt, in a post about a lecture given by Manuel DeLanda on the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze argues that we cannot understand the world outside of our interpretation of it. The world, according to the blog post, can only be understood in terms of discourse rather than in terms of materiality. Matt’s argument, what I will describe as “postmodern” (for the sake of simplicity), is a critique of DeLanda’s “realism.” This particular variant of realism contends that things exist independently of our understanding and knowledge of them. So when we think of the classic question: If a tree falls in the forest and nobody’s around, does it still make a sound? - a postmodernist might answer “no,” while the realist would say “yes.”
In outlining realism’s perspective on “expressivity,” DeLanda uses an example of crystals, which, he argues, express their “crystalness” regardless of whether humans can perceive it or not. Expressivity, in this sense, is therefore not dependent on human interpretation, but exists outside of the human experience. In another example, DeLanda speaks of a species of bird with a number a variants. The first type of bird is full of blue colour, and attracts mates with ease. The second type of bird is partially feathered in blue, and therefore must try harder to create a nest to attract a mate. The third type of bird has almost no blue at all, and resorts to finding pieces of blue - from flowers to bottlecaps - to decorate its nest to attract a mate. DeLanda argues that this example provides convincing evidence that “art” exists outside of human space and prior to human consciousness. Art, traditionally understood to be a human endeavor and construct, can exist without human interaction: “Deleuze essentially disputed the distinction between epistemology and ontology. The subject is creative and is as much a part of the given as that which floods over it. In the experience of the given we make associations that determine our actions. Those actions come up against and flow with the world external to the subject. As the subject is necessarily a subject among subjects those around it will experience its actions as part of their given. Consequently they too react. One of the most important claims made by DeLanda is that it is not only humans who are subjects. Instead all of existence interact in this way and therefore all of existence has a history.”1
While Matt’s post makes a methodological and epistemological analysis, I want to think about DeLanda’s argument another way. I would argue that interrogating DeLanda on methodological grounds (perhaps even on epistemological grounds), while fruitful, misses an important pragmatic implication of the lecture. First, a philosophical question: does nature - the tree, for example - have intrinsic value or instrumental value? Is the tree good in and of itself or is the tree only good because of its value to humans? Many organizations pushing for environmental protection make the instrumentalist argument that ecological destruction threatens human survival. This instrumentalism, being anthropocentric (human-centered), is challenged by DeLanda’s argument on the expressivity of natural things. An implication of DeLanda’s argument is that nature - rocks, trees, bears - should have equal standing to humans in both philosophical inquiry and political action. However, such a non-anthropocentric approach, while arguing that trees and rocks exist independently of our interpretation of them, would not conclude that we are not part of nature. Rather, it begs the question of rethinking our relationship with and position within nature and the nature of things.
Thinking additionally about a recent blog post by Elise, a second question that follows from the above discussion is about praxis in environmental activism: is it more effective to advocate for environmental protection through an understanding of nature as instrumental in value or as possessing intrinsic value? Maybe the general apathy about ecological protection is because of the particular approach taken by environmental activists. By making primarily an instrumentalist argument (though there are some non-instrumentalist approaches2), activists are debating within the boundaries of the dominant discourse of cost-benefit analysis: people will only make environmental choices if it will make their own lives better rather than worse. If the postmodern approach (in this particular instance) is anthropocentric, then would a realist (or “critical realist,” but that’s a whole other blog post) perspective be more conducive to the case for environmental protection? Promoting an argument for the intrinsic value of nature, in addition to the many instrumentalist arguments already out there, may go a long way in building support for environmentalism and stemming ecological destruction. So when we think about the expressivity of the rock or the intrinsic value of the tree, the necessary question becomes: how can we put forth more effective non-anthropocentric arguments that are both transformative and acceptable to the public?
*photo source: missouriskies.org
Notes:- Thanks Troy, as well as Manuel DeLanda (1997), A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History, Swerve Editions (MIT Press), New York. [↩]
- Some have argued for eco-feminist, deep ecology or theological approaches [↩]
Eliot Che is a researcher and web developer. He studies the political implications of technological transformation and the social effects of virtual space. His other interests include human rights, art activism and untraining his dog, Max.
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I think both the questions you’re concerned with here might be productively addressed if we introduce a third category of value, namely constitutive value. This is the kind of value possessed, for example, by a friend - my relationship with my friend is an ingredient of my well-being. My friend is not thereby instrumentally useful, as she is not a substitutable means to an end: the health of my relationship with her is dependent on her wellbeing ‘for herself’ as it were. The specific meaning her intrinsic value has for me is determined through my relationship to her (here, if you like, is where the Deleuzean expressivity of our relationship might come in).
What has constitutive value for me is therefore cared about because I feel it is essential to my wellbeing, but I care about it in itself for this reason. If we consider the social and non-social ecologies that support us from this perspective (cf Paul Schollmeier and John O’Neill, for example), then I would suggest it gives us a different purchase on what nature means to us, one which draws on certain models of care ethics, in which a universalistic perspective of justice grows from out of a situated perspective of care.
From a pedagogical and praxis-related point of view, it suggests that (straining towards) a global perspective needs to emerge from ‘local’ experience. Action directed towards regional or global problems has to be grounded in a concern for local interdependencies. This does not imply ‘getting back’ to a form of transcendentalist experience of nature outside society: rather, it implies being educated in understanding the social & natural ecological complexity of our everyday lives, and becoming more initimately aware of how the world constitutively matters to us.
This concept of constitutive value calls to mind an important distinction that De Landa makes between an individual’s properties and its capacities. Individual entities have a denumerable list of properties. However, they also have indeterminate capacities. These capacities they exercise ‘in assemblage.’ Drawing on an example used by Deleuze: the Huns had the capacity to become a war machine when they formed assemblages with biological and technological entities - the horse and the stirrup; once mounted and seated they became the most powerful force on the planet.
Thinking in terms of capacities and what the ethics are of being allowed to exercise capacities could take us in a new direction with regards to environmentalism.